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Prologue 
The predominant characteristic of the mathematician, 
as the writer sees him, is that of unrest, for the math-
ematician is never fully satisfied. To illustrate, he 
accepts the challen~e offered by a problem new to him. Un-
til he sees the solution to the problem in entirety, he is 
tense, anxious. After the problem ha.s been solved, calm 
is restored and the thrill of accomplishment supplants the 
former tenseness. Offhand, then, it would appear that the 
mathematician at this star:i:e is satisfied and can lean back 
in his chair, contented. Before long, ho'·1ever, he meets 
another problem, accepts the challen~e, and again feels 
tensions which will be resolved only when the problem is 
resolved in his own mind. He begins to suspect that after 
the present challen~e there will be another, and then an-
other. 
What, then, leads the mathematician on? What does he 
hope to accomplish? Why does awareness of a new problem-
situation invite consideration on his part, rather than 
rejection? What is the mathematician trying to do? 
In the first place, a problem by its very nature supgests 
an incompleteness, a lack, something missing. The mathe-
matician, discontented with ·9uzzles not completely fitted 
together, finds himself searching for a pattern in order 
that he may discover the missing pieces. Not happy with 
isolated statements, he strives to establish relationships 
among the statements. Finally, by inferences dra-1•m from 
the relationships discovered, he sees the solution and con-
sequently the entire pattern. An admiration for "whole-
ness" then, partly explains the drive activating the mathe-
matician. 
In addition, the mere realization of the presence of a 
challenge invites action from ~yone so geared. That is, 
such a person feels that he ~ accept the challenge pre-
sented to him. To ignore the challenge is unthinkable. 
Similarly, the story is told tha.t a mountain-climber, asked 
to analyze his reasons for scaling a particular mountain, 
explained that he had to climb the mountain simply because 
the mountain was there. The presence of the mountain con-
stituted the challenge, finding the best manner in which to 
scale the mountain was the problem, and making the actual 
climb would prove his acceptance of the challenge. 
Besides revealing a yearning for "wholeness" and a 
desire to meet headlong any challenging situation, the 
mathematician shows a keen responsiveness to beauty. For 
one thing, he finds beauty in a perfectly constructed proof. 
True, the ordered symmetry of the proof may not be at all 
apparent to one whose eye and mind are not so attuned. 
However, lack of awareness of beauty on the part of some 
people does not mean the proof holds no attractiveness for 
anyone. Thus, one piece of land may belong to a Mr. 
Jackson, the adjoining piece may belong to a Mr. Reeves, 
but the landscape belongs to whoever has the eye to behold 
it. 
The mathematician sees beauty not only in the proof 
before him, but also in the reasoning which has produced 
the proof. Clear-cut ideas, precisely and forcefully 
expressed, are interesting in themselves, thereby attract-
ing the mathematician's attention and evoking his admiration. 
However, the aspect of the mathematician's life that 
is probably most often slighted in appraisals is his creative-
ness. For instance, in solving a problem or in proving a 
theorem he has constructed something, a whole out of what 
were disorganized segments. By examining the segments, 
by visualizing a pattern connecting them, and by supplying 
missing parts, he has built a structure, an idea resting 
on a firm foundation of logical reasoning. Moreover, the 
idea so structured is acceptable, indeed irresistible, to 
anyone subscribing to the assumptions on which the reason-
ing is based. He may express his creativeness in attacking 
a familiar relationship from a new point of view; he may 
pose a challenging problem to his students, his colleagues, 
or his family; or, if he is one of a privileged few, he 
may have the happy experience of building up by induction 
a theorem heretofore not guessed by anyone. 
Whether the mathematician's efforts are examined for 
aspects of "wholeness", beauty, or creativeness, one fact 
must surely be noted. In common with the work of scholars 
in other fields, his work evidences a search for truth, or 
rather, a search for what he conceives to be truth. 
In his attempts to discover truth, though, he realizes 
that he will never fully succeed. After all, as that 
discerning mathematician, Edson H. Taylor, has remarked, 
"The search for truth is an infinite process." The math-
ematician, teased by a question that will not leave him 
alone, applies resources of ingenuity, concentration, and 
tar-sightedness to getting the answer. By the time the one 
question has been dealt with to his satisfaction, other 
questions have arisen, each just as insistent as the first. 
Sometimes, in his search for answers, he has had the 
thrill of getting sudden, totally unexpected insi~ht into 
the problem at hand. That is, he may have grasped immedi-
ately the very relationship pointing to the solution, when 
he had ~ previously worked out the pertinent steps. Then 
too, it is just possible that, when involved in proving a 
theorem, he has seen in a "flash", so to speak, what step 
he should take next. Since the mathematician attributes 
both of these exciting flashes of understandina: to intu-
ition, he may, in the course of his adventures, find him-
self wondering about intuition and subsequently huntin,e: 
for explanations. 
Chapter I 
Introduction to Intuition 
Down through the ages, in all places and at all times, 
man has been seeking truth. At times truth has stood madden-
ingly close, yet has eluded capture. At other times, despite 
endless efforts with test-tube and beaker, with Geiger 
counter and atom-smasher, it has stood aloof, unreachable. 
On still other occasions, for brief moments, it has ap-
peared tractable, even attainable. 
Thus history has witnessed Abraham following the dir-
ection of an invisible P,Od into a promised land, Euclid 
applying with vigor his powers of organization, and Omar 
Khayyam, despite emphasis on the here-and-now, looking for 
order in algebra. Still later arises ~pinoza, who, in his 
seclusion, searches for answers to the insistent question 
of what constitutes knowledge. 
In addition to considering what is true, man has been 
-
teased by the puzzle of explaininp: .!:!.£! he knows a particu-
lar belief to be true. Accordingly, he may ascribe an idea 
to intuition. That is, he may have had the experience of 
"knowing", when he had not previously come across evidence 
that would "prove" his idea to be true. Perhaps now is the 
time to bring out a point often overlooked, that the lack 
of proof does not necessarily indicate that a statement is 
false, or even doubtful. As an extreme example, it is con-
ceivable that a person might be unable to supply any testi-
mony or record of his birth. Thus he could not prove, in 
a legal sense, that he had ever been born. A few years 
1. 
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ago a Syrian lecturer lampooned the American emphasis on 
birth certificates. Apparently in Syria the mere presence 
of the person was considered evidence enough of the fact 
of birth. 
In addition to intuition there are three other ways of 
knowing, which will be examined in a moment. Let us think 
of the ways of knowing as the rungs of a ladder with the 
most honored, reliable method at the top. Obviously £roof 
occupies the topmost rung. At the other extreme, and there 
may well be argument' Vie are goinp; to place intuition. No 
attempt will be made to assign authority and experiment to 
definite rungs, as the dependability of either of these 
hinges upon the care with which it is used. 
For instance, upon examining authority as a method 
of knowing facts, probably the most serious consideration 
lies in what one is willing to call an authority. \'v'hat 
are his credentials? Is he recognized as an authority by 
people whose opinion can be respected't Is he a "self-
styled" authority? The fact that his statements have been 
published does not make him an authority. Yet frequently 
gullible people are willing to accept the most outlandish 
claims, simply because such claims have been published. 
Such people will believe everything from the label on a 
patent-medicine bottle to an au~ust pronouncement that the 
world is about to end. 
Furthermore, the fact that a person speaks or writes 
in a self-assured manner does not make him an authority. 
Indeed, much self-assurance results from too little infor-
3. 
mation, or from knowledge about only one aspect of a sub-
ject. Even the fact that a man is regarded highly by the 
a 
scholars of the day asArecognized authority does not mean 
that he is in possession of absolute truth. .ti·or example, 
Aristotle was for centuries deemed the source of inf or-
-
mation on anatomy and almost every other subject as well. 
According to legend, if a mediaeval teacher were dissecting 
a dog for the benefit of his anatomy class, and if one of 
the dog's organs did not comply with what was written in 
Aristotle's book, the dog was wrongi 
Another limitation to using authority as a way to 
support arguments is the fact that although a man may have 
convinced himself that the authority he is naming really is 
such, the person with whom he is debating may not accept 
that same source as reliable. Consider for a moment the 
task of trying to convince a Buddhist of vhristian beliefs 
by quoting the Bible. Apparently, for any individual, an 
authority is any source that, for various reasons, he acce!)ts 
as sound; consequently, he uses the source both to gain 
new information and support opinions that to him seem valid. 
As to the matter of experiment, there seem to be at 
least four weaknesses or limitations. Yirst, and this re-
quirement surely could not be over-stressed, is the con-
dition that the experimenter must assure himself that he 
is controlline all but one factor. Otherwise he cannot 
know that the result obtained has stemmed from the one con-
dition for which he is testing. Another difficulty lies 
4. 
in attempting to duplicate conditions in a series of ex-
periments. If the experimenter is not extremely cautious 
in this respect, he will be unable safely to draw a gen-
eralization from his result. In the third place, there is 
the liability of his concluding more than what has actually 
been established. As an illustration, suppose a hybrid 
black r,uinea pig were mated to another hybrid black one. 
On authority of those who have conducted the experiment, 
there is a strong probability that one-fourth of the off-
spring will be white, the others, black. Suppose a man 
not conversant with the laws of heredity were to look at 
the two black parents, look at the offspring, regard es-
pecially the black ones, and conclude that all the black 
ones were hybrid with respect to color of coat. Such a 
conclusion would appear "reasonable", as the presence of 
the white offspring would lead him to think that the black 
ones could not be pure-line black. However, this is a 
false conclusion, for actually any one of the black off-
spring might be pure-line black, a point that would be 
settled if the study were carried through to the extent 
of crossing a black one with one that was known to be hy-
brid with respect to color. The occurrence of no white ones 
in the third generation thus produced would indicate defi-
nitely that the questionable parent was pure-line. Thus, 
to get back to the original pair considered, the conclusion 
drawn by the man was unsound. In summation, all that he 
had actually established was that crossing a particular 
5. 
black male guinea pig with a particular black female guinea 
pig yielded offspring, some of which were black, others, 
white. That one fact was all that he had ascertained as 
a result of that particular experiment. 
A fourth limitation in the use of experiment is the 
obvious fact that one cannot test all cases. At first 
glance, some may be surprised at the mention of anything 
so readily apparent. However, as one cannot test all cases 
having like conditions, one cannot determine the results 
for all cases. Hence one cannot know through experimentation 
that a certain set of conditions yields a certain result 
for all cases. 
Although it is impossible to test all cases, it is 
possible, nevertheless, to establish the validity of a 
formula by the process of mathematical induction. This 
process, which consists of only two steps, will be re-
viewed by making reference to the formula involving com-
pound interest. The formula, A ~ P(l + rt, gives the 
amount A to which an original principal P would accumulate 
in n years if invested at an interest rate r, compounded 
annually. Since the interest is compounded, there is a 
new principal at the beginning of each successive year. 
It is easy to see that, at the beginninp of the second 
year, the new principal will be (P +Pr), which equals 
P{l + r}. Thus, at the beginning of the third year, the 
new principal will be P(l + r) + P(l + r)r, which, when 
.1 
simplified, becomes P(l + r) • By a similar argument, the 
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new principal at the beginning of the fourth year can be 
.a 
shown to be equal to P ( 1 + r} • However, the formula has 
been tested only in those cases in which n is equal to 1, 
2, or 3. It is unsafe to assume at this juncture that the 
formula will hold for all integral n. 
-
The solution to this dilemma lies in applying the 
process that is termed mathematical induction. First of 
all, the formula is assumed to be valid for some value of 
n, for instance, for n equal to s. The immediate goal is 
to show the existence of an inheritance property, namely, 
that the validity of the formula for n equal to s implies 
the validity of the corresponding formula for the succeed-
ing integral value, s + 1. 'l'hus, we assume that at the end 
of s years, the accumulation is· P{l+ r)5 • Since, during 
$ 
the next year, the interest earned will be P{l + r) r, at 
the end of {s + 1) years, the total amount can be shown to 
..S+l 
be P{l + r) , which establishes the inheritance pro-
perty. Once the all-important inheritance property has 
been established, one can assume that, if the formula is 
verified for some specific value of n, usually for n equal 
to 1, then the formula is likewise true for the case in 
which n is equal to the next successive integer. Of course, 
this last statement is tantamount to saying that the for-
mula holds for all n. Usually, however, the verification 
for a specific value is established first; then, the in-
heritance property is shown to exist. Hence, although not 
all cases can be tested, ~ertain formulas can be established 
by mathematical induction. 
In general, the validity of any proposition is rec-
ognized most readily, if the proposition has been proved. 
Built upon a foundation of certain statements deemed ac-
ceptable, a proof proceeds along the lines decreed by logic, 
step by step, to an unequivocal conclusion. Thus, he who 
subscribes to the statements on which the proof is con-
structed is necessarily convinced of the "truth" or the 
conclusion. Characterized by a high degree of reliability 
and certainty, therefore, the method of proof deservedly 
occupies the position of greatest honor, the topmost rung. 
When using this method, one must be sure, if the proof is 
to be rigorous, that every step can be supported by something 
previously accepted. That is, each step must be substantiated 
by a proof already established, by a definition, or by an 
assumption, together with correct application of the rules 
pertaining to logical inference. Moreover, even before 
attempting to outline the proof, the student meets a size-
able hurdle. That is, he has the responsibility of seeing 
to it that he does not introduce special conditions. To put 
it differently, he must determine that he does not assume 
any conditions other than those specifically stated by the 
hypotheses. This careless intrusion of special conditions 
is particularly dangerous at the stage when he starts to 
make a drawing. For instance, if the hypotheses of a the-
orem in tenth-grade geometry mention a parallelogram, the 
student, in making an illustration, must not draw a rectangle, 
s. 
as the rectangle is a special type of parallelogram. If 
the student were to draw a rectan~le, he would be assuming 
that he was to deal with perpendicular lines and ninety-
degree angles. That is, he would be ,P'.uilty of having in-
truded special conditions, conditions neither explicitly 
stated nor even implied in the hypotheses. 
In these remarks, it is hoped that a groundwork for 
the study of intuition has been laid. In laying such ground-
work, we have presented intuition as one of four ways of 
knowing. Having dealt with the limitations of three of 
the ways, we shall venture next into a discussion of the 
mysteries of intuition itself. 
c..:hapter II 
Characteristics of Intuition 
Probably the most formidable deterrent to the study 
of intuition is the difficulty of definition. At the out-
set the impossibility of defining the term with exactness 
is asserted; arguments to support this assertion will now 
be outlined. Later, the characteristics of intuition will 
be noted and examined in some detail. 
For one thing, the abstractness of the term makes pre-
cise definition difficult. Invisible, inaudible, and most 
certainly intangible, intuition does not lend itself to 
the type of detci.iled observation possible with concrete 
objects. That is, the student of intuition cannot examine 
his subject as he might inspect, for instance, a picture, 
a musical composition, or a rose. Since the properties 
are of an elusive quality, they prevent proper classifi-
cation, a prerequisite to definition. Of course, abstract-
ness alone does not imply the impossibility of definition, 
but surely at best such a condition makes the task of de-
fining an imposing one. 
A far stronger argument against definition lies in the 
fact that what is intuitively obvious to one may not be, to 
another.l That is, if the application of a concept is 
familiar to a man, he is apt to give that concept intuitive 
1. 
American 
Hans Hahn, "Geometry and Intuitionn, 
(April, 1954}, CXC, 84 ff. Scientific 
10. 
status. A fact intuitively clear to a mechanic might be 
known to another only as a conclusion derived from the most 
involved reasoning. A relationship £"rasped immediately by 
a mathematician mi7ht never be suspected by another. An 
observation ascribed to intuition by a botanist mi.1'.!'ht well 
be questioned by the uninitiated. 
Since there is room for vast disa~reement as to just 
what ideas may be knov.m by intuition, it follows that in-
tuition itself cannot be categorized or pigeon-holed in 
an unimpeachable manner. Hence the term intuition defies 
definition. 
Although the term remains undefined, or perhaps be-
cause of the very lack of precise definition, it is im-
perative that intuition at least be described. Accord-
ingly, as intimated in the first paragraph, several char-
acteristics will be viewed. 
In the first place, intuition is not diametrically 
opposed to reason. l''or example, the personnel manager of 
an industrial firm finds himself confronted with eleven 
applications for a particular job. He will conduct a 
short interview with each applicant with the object of 
eliminating eight of the hopefuls. At almost the first 
glance, and after the slightest exchange of words, he will 
have judged which eight 1:vill be unsuited to the work. Intu-
ition has at least helped in forming the first judgments. 
That is, the man "feels" that a pri.rticular three will be 
well-suited to answering the demands of the job. At the 
11. 
next stage, the most careful reasoning must be employed. 
The personnel manager must sort through several different 
kinds of evidence, such as the ratings of former employers, 
judgments pertainine to the applicant's character, and con-
sidered opinions as to personality traits, such as prompt-
ness, dependability, initiative, and cooperativeness. All 
evidence he must weigh carefully in the hopes of choosing 
the best of the remaining three. Thus intuition plus care-
ful reasoning guide his selection. 
As another instance, a student has been assigned a 
theorem to Prove. He observes not only all facts given in 
the hypothesis, but also the relationship he is to prove. 
By reasoning, he determines the validity of each step, but 
which step to take next is often indicated by intuition. 
Again, logical reasoning has worked alongside intuition to 
produce results. 
Although ·intuition and logical reasoning may operate 
simultaneously in the solution of a problem, intuition can 
be described as a way of getting ideas without words, a 
short cut to knowledge. Understandably then, a person chal-
lenged to support a view known intuitively will be at a 
loss for words to explain h2!' he knows. 
Furthermore, intuition is possibly almost the only way 
of reasoning employed by those people who have given no 
12. 
study to the subject of reaching conclusions.l '!'hose who 
have never given thought to deduction as a way of drawing 
inferences continually make "snap judgments", not neces-
sarily false; seemingly, such persons do not fall back 
on logic to defend their views. 
The reference just made to the fact that "snap judg-
ments" are not always incorrect suggests a point that can 
hardly be stressed too much, namely, that intuitive rea-
soning is not necessarily weak or faulty. .1.1·or instance, 
there is the trite case of the wife who warns her husband 
against having business dealings with a man she has just 
met. When pressed for reasons, she asserts only that she 
knows the would-be business associate cannot be trusted. 
Of course, the concluding portion of such a tale always 
depicts the wife's predictions fulfilled and the husband's 
undying gratitude for having been warned in time. 
In addition, intuition is usuaily a satisfactory guide 
in reaching conclusions to the extent that things seem to 
be as they are. Thus the student, upon inspecting a pair 
of intersecting lines for the first time, intuitively con-
the 
eludes thatAvertical angles are equal. The vertical angles 
appear to be equal; they are equal. 
1. The phrase "intuitive reasoning" may be paradoxical 
to some; that is, some observers may with vehemence claim 
that if a fact be intuitively known, then that fact cannot 
have stemmed from reasoning. If the term reasoning gives 
difficulty, perhaps intuition can be thougnt of as-a faculty 
of the human mind which acts outside the realm of conscious-
- - -~· 
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In situations in which appearances are deceivin~, 
however, intuition can mislead, as in the case of optical 
illusions. A notable instance of such misleading is found 
in the belief formerly held that the earth was flat. ~uch 
a view of the earth is reasonably consistent with what one 
observes and is therefore understa.ndable. Hence intuition 
is reliable only in those instances in which a situation 
appears to be the way it actually is. 
All knowledge gained intuitively has been obtained in 
one of two ways, either by sense intuition or by intellec-
tual intuition. In this discussion, sense intuition shall 
mean a situation such as the following. With reference 
again to the two intersecting straight lines, a person re-
garding the lines realizes the vertical angles formed are 
equal. The fact that such a relationship can be proved 
does not add to sureness. His realization that the vertical 
angles are equal is a fact known by sense intuition, the 
sense concerned being that of sight. It has been found that 
many people limit the use of the word intuition to desig-
nating the sense type only. 
An example of intellectual intuition, as the term is 
understood by the ·.vriter, can be found in problem-solving. 
At a certain step in the work, the problem-solver, upon 
examining the data already assembled, sees two possible 
avenues to follow. Without resorting to trial-and-error, 
he decides his plan of action. ~uch a plan, it seems, can 
be said to be known by intellectual intuition, for none 
of his senses have played a major part in his reaching a 
decision. 
It is only natural that the lack of precise definition 
has resulted in a confusion regardin~ the use of the term, 
intuitiQB. Since the word is apparently freauently mis-
used, a discussion of t.he kinds of misuse may, by contrast, 
clarify correct usage. We are alluding to the practice of 
using the word intuition as a cover-up for a belief or a 
prejudice that cannot actually be proved. A case in point 
concerns an incident factual, by the way, in which a lady 
sought to reinforce her belief in the superiority of the 
white race over other races by stating that such a view 
was intuitively held and obviously valid. When asked to 
supply documentary evidence, all she could do was to fall 
back on the usual meaningless cliches plus her personal 
interpretR.tion of intuition~ 
A similar instance of misuse deals with the employer 
who steadfastly refuses to hire what he terms a foreigner. 
It may be that to him, a foreigner is anyone whose name is 
not Anglo-Saxon. However that may be, when questioned on 
his policies, he asserts vehemently that the wisdom of his 
action should be clear by intuition. Clearly he is imply-
ing that, if anyone questions his viewpoint, the fault 
cannot lie in the employer's attitude, but rather in the 
challenger's intuitive powers. 
Although there assuredly are instances when intuition 
may be at fault, there is encouragement in the thought that 
15. 
intuitive powers can possibly be improved. Some do not 
accept the possibility of such improvement; such skeptics 
may consider their position somewhat weakened by the account 
of a class conducted by the c?eneral Electric Company several 
years ago.1 Enrolled in a course called "practical engineer-
ing", the twenty college graduates spent class sessions tel-
ling one another their hunches, just as they thought of them. 
The act of explaining their ideas to others helped to clar-
ify their own thinking, initiated by the hunches, which, in 
turn, were suggested by intuition. Although class sessions 
were characterized by discussion, the time outside class 
was characterized by action, and plenty of it. That is, 
outside the classroom, the students performed whatever 
operations were indicated in order to carry out their hunches. 
The tangible result of the course was a formidable number 
of inventions useful to the company. ivioreover, the ac-
complishments of the class are all the more interesting in 
view of the fact that some of those enrolled had never in-
vented anything before. 
Reactions to this account are bound to vary greatly. 
'l'he sponsors of the class enthusiastically point out the 
imposing array of "first inventionsn. According to the 
sponsors, the student's inventions were based on intuitively-
1. c. G. Suits, "Heed That Hunch", American Magazine 
(December, 1945), CXL, 142. 
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obtained hunches. The production of such inventions proves, 
they reason, that the methods of conducting the class had 
developed or broadened the students' intuitive powers. 
Their opponents might claim, on the other hand, that the 
sponsors had succumbed to the "post hoc" fallacy. It is 
just possible that those enrolled in the class would have 
carried out their inventions, even if they had not ever been 
members of the "practical engineerinp.;" class. In other words, 
perhaps the sponsors had cited a cause-effect relationship 
that was not valid. 
Those who accept the premise that a broadenin~ of in-
t ui ti ve powers is possible will naturally wonder just what 
factors are conducive to such broadening. More explicitly, 
what traits or habits can be developed in order to achieve 
such a goal? One writer suggests, among other things, train-
ing oneself in alertness, sensitivity, and discipline of 
mind.l The mention of these three undoubtedly worthy aids 
makes the improvement of intuitive powers sound far from 
an easy task. Another observer is more specific, for he 
says outright that one's interests should be broadened, in 
order that intuition can be supplied with plenty of mater-
ial. 2 ~eemingly, the more varied the experiences, the 
greater the possibility of insight into a given situation. 
Furthermore, one should learn not to distrust a new 
idea simply because it is foreign; rather, one should welcome 
1. John Kord Lagemann, "You're Smarter Than You Think", 
Reader's Digest {March, 1952), LX, 40. 
( 2f!. C. G, Suit:::s, "Heed That Hunch" t American .Magazine Decemoer, 1945) CXL, 143. 
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the new idea. As an illustration, a student, after several 
unsuccessful bouts with a formidable problem, may be on the 
verge of despair. Perhaps at that very moment a radically 
different approach occurs to him. If he is wise, he will 
not summarily dismiss the new thought as ridiculous or il-
logical. After all, in order to solve his problem, he may 
need an entirely new view; perhaps he needs an "overview". 
On the chance that his new slant will lead to the insight 
requisite for success, he should study the ramifications 
of the new idea. At the very least, he needs to consider 
as many aspects of the idea as are necessary to indicate 
definitely whether or not the idea is practicable. 
The last suggestion for the improvement of intuitive 
powers to be made is of unquestionable validity, as it has 
been practiced so often by so many different people. When 
confronted with a problem which defies solution, the prob-
lem-solver should write down all the details as far as he 
can go. Then he should lay the problem aside for a while. 
During the "cooling'' period, while the problem-solver is 
engaged in some radically different activity, he may get 
complete, full insight into the problem. 
In this chapter, we have not only given arguments 
against defining the term intuition, but we have alee de-
scribed several characteristics of intuition. Although 
the term is not precisely defined, this paper will be con-
sistent in the way in which the word is used. Throughout, 
intuition shall be used in relation to situations in which 
facts are directly known, without recourse to lo~ical 
reasoning. 
Chapter III 
Intuition and Problem-solving 
To the mathematician, the facet of intuition that is 
probably most conspicuous is the role played in nroblem-
solving. An integral part of the mathematician's activ-
ities, the quest for solutions to problems appears to he 
a dominant feature of other disciplines as well. Thus the 
physicist, the chemist, the zoologist, and the geographer 
owe at least some of the developments in their fields to 
the existence of problems, or rather, to the fact that cer-
tain problems have been tackled and resolved. Ferhaps it 
is not too sweeping a statement to assert that every type 
of progress experienced by the human race has resulted from 
someone's awareness of a problem. 
Since problems arise continually, not only in fields 
of study but in every-day situations as ·well, it behooves 
us to take at least a passin,r: glance at a few considered 
opinions on problem-solving; we can hope therefrom to be 
able to draw one or two reliable conclusions. Before under-
taking a study of the function of intuition in solvin~ prob-
lems, however, one should understand the special, directed 
type of thinkins necessary for getting solutions. Such 
understanding, in turn, implies an acquaintance with the 
mechanism of the thinking process plus an over-all view of 
the ways of thinking commonly employed. 
Accordingly, the present discussion will first deal 
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with the ways of thinking as categorized by three observers. 
In the first place, Cassius J. Keyser considers all vari-
eties of thinking as falling into three main groups, the 
organic, the empirical, and the postulational.l The 
simplest type, the organic, is nothing more than the re-
sponse of a living or:.:ranism to a stimulus. To illustrate, 
a one-celled ani:1al, the amoeba, as soon as it comes into 
contact with an object, attempts to encl:")se the object, 
thus forming a food vacuole. Instantly, once contact has 
taken place, the amoeba's cytoplasm streams in such a way 
as to surround the object encountered. Once the fusion 
of the streams of cytoplasm occurs, the object, contained 
in a food vacuole, has become a part of the animal's struc-
ture. 
Higher in the scale of thinking is the empirical tyne, 
which is experimental in nature. A certain degree of logic 
is involved, although not to the extent characteristic of 
the most complex type of thinking. An example of the em-
pirical variety is the discovery of the formula for chem-
ical conversion, dx/dt:: - kx, in which x represents the 
amount of unconverted substance at any particular time,t. 
Careful experimentation has revealed that the rc:1te at which 
a substance is converted into another is directly proportion-
al to the amount of unconverted substance. The right member 
of the formula is negative, because, as the time increases, 
1. Cassius J. Keyser, 'l'hinking About Thinking (New 
York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 192 ), 7 ff. 
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the amount of unconverted substance decreases. As a gen-
eralization based entirely upon past experimentation, the 
formula gives a way of predicting the future behavior of 
substances, as reg2rds rate of entering into combination 
with others. 
Into the third category is placed the most com~1lex, 
involved kind of thinking, the postulational. Such think-
ing, which is described by Keyser as deductive, is a method 
of reasoning that is applicable to all fields, not just to 
mathematics. However, since geometry lends itself so 
beautifully to any discussion concerning deductive reason-
ing, an illustration will be taken from that field. The 
high school sophomore, when settin~ out to prove the pro-
position that two points equally distant from the extremities 
of a line determine the perpendicular bisector of the line, 
will probably add four auxiliary lines as his first maneuver. 
After proving congruent two of the pairs of trian~les so 
formed, he ultimately establishes the conclusion of the 
theorem. 
Of course, the usual form in which the above example 
of deductive reasoning would be written would '.)resent a 
different order from that employed in more general situ-
ations, especially, the non-mathematical. That is, although 
deduction commonly follows the procedure from general stc?.te-
ment to specific statement to conclusion, in the above proof 
the thinking would proceed from the specific statement to 
the conclusion and then, to the general statement. Either 
procedure can uroduce gems of precise, clear, deductive 
thinking. 
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Providing an interesting contrast to the groupings 
just described is the system in which four degrees of com-
plexity are recognized.l According to this second arrange-
ment, thinking is classified under the heads of perceiving, 
recognizing, comparative judging, and reasoning. Listed 
in order of increased complexity, one notes that only the 
very highest type is di~nified by the name reasoning. 
A third method of dealing with the kine: s of thinking 
consists of grouping all thinkinr, under three classes, in-
tuitive, deductive, and inductive.2 Such a .fSrOUping is 
distinctive for two reasons. For one thing, intuition is 
given a place among other kinds of thinking. Still more 
intriguing, though, is the fact that there is no attempt 
to label one type as simple, another, as complex. The 
source consulted says sim':ly that there are three kinds of 
thinking and proceeds to name,them. 
Even a cursory glance at the three foregoing methods 
of classification sugrrests that the three men who composed 
the lists could not have been defining the term thinking 
in the same way. What is more significant in relation to 
1. R. H. Wheeler, The Science of Psychology, as 
quoted in William Betz' The Teachin~ .2f Intuitive Geometry, 
Eighth Yearbook, Nationa"I'""i:'ouncil o Teachers of Mathe-
matics (New York, Bureau of Publications, Teachers Colle.r:e, 
Columbia University, 1933), 146. 
2. Lee Emerson Boyer, Mathematics a Historical Develop-
~ (New York, Henry Holt and Company, "1945), 303 ff. 
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the title of this chapter, however, is the inclusion in 
each list of at least one kind of thinking utilized in prob-
lem-solving. 
In the course of classifying the ways of thinking, 
one inevitably speculates about the actual mechanism of 
thinking itself. Moreover, the mathematician is especially 
curious about the manner in which direction is given to 
his thinking. He realizes that at worst, his thinking is 
no more than a jumble of disconnected links, whereas, at 
best, it presents a chain of ideas that are neatly hooked 
together. He wants to analyze the situations in which his 
thinking has been orderly and systematized; he hopes there-
by to be able to apply the all-important direction to the 
disconnected links, wherever and whenever he meets them. 
When reviewing several cases in which his thinking 
has been truly fruitful, the mathematician discovers that 
consistently he has emphasized the structural aspects.I 
That is, in stressing the nwholeness 11 of the situation, he 
has envisaged the given facts and sought-for solution as 
comprising ~ pattern. Success resulted from ferreting 
out the inter-relationships among the given facts and the 
ideas inferred from the given facts. However, this stete-
ment does not give the whole truth, for, just as important, 
if not more so, is the discovery of the relation each single 
1. Max Wertheimer, Productive Thinking (New York, 
Harper and Brothers, 1945), !9o. 
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fact be~rs to the whole pattern. 
Emphasizing the whole pattern or structure has at least 
two advantages over traditional logic as an explanation of 
the way thinkinc~ occurs.l In the first place, since think-
ing takes place in living or~anisms, any explanation con-
cerning the process of thinkin~ must take into account the 
element of change. Traditional logic, however, is static; 
it does not allow for the changes which take place in any 
problem-situation during the course of a given discussion. 
Such changes do indeed occur, for, as each additional re-
lationship is understood, the whole picture is seen in a 
new light. ~·urthermore, the emphasis on logic tacitly im-
plies that an idea is simply the sum of its narts, that is, 
the steps leading up to the idea. In both respects, aware-
ness of structure appears to be the more nearly accurate 
explanation of the mechanism of thinking, since such an 
explanation recognizes inevitable change and also includes 
the relationships of individual ideas to the whole pattern. 
Thus, the process of thinking appears to be characterized 
by a search for relationships and an appreciation of the 
structure of a given situation, a structure that necessarily 
changes from moment to moment. 
At this point, the mathematician may ponder on the 
causes of the changes in structure experienced as he pro-
ceeds from step to step in working out a solution to a prob-
lem. Why, at a particular point, is a particular relation-
1. Max Wertheimer, Productive Thinking (New York, 
Harper and Brothers, 1945), 192. 
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ship suggested? What initiates his moving in a n;:-rticular 
direction? In brief, what guides his thinking? Some may 
answer that his mind is working in accordance with the pre-
scribed rules of logic. Of course, he likes to picture 
himself as proceeding logically, but the question of cause 
still bothers him. One observer goes so far as to claim 
that there is almost never a completely logical discovery. 1 
Intuition is involved, nearly always; at least, intuition 
explains the guidance which directs the first step taken 
in thinking through a loi:;ical proof. Others would soften 
this statement considerably by asserting merely that intu-
ition may indicate what step to take. 
Inasmuch as an analytic proof to a theorem often pre-
cedes a synthetic proof, it would seem that intuition would 
more likely be instrumental in determining the order of the 
steps of the analytic proof. Thus, those who credit intu-
ition with playing a role in the writinr; of proofs 1·muld 
probably ascribe the determination of the steps of the fol-
lowing proof to intuition. Lest anyone be misled, let us 
make clear the fact that when -,,,re refer to the determination 
of steps, we mean the order, not the validity of the steps. 
The validity, of course, is ascertained by logic. 
In proving a theorem analytically, the general pattern 
is to proceed backwards, from the conclusion to the hynoth-
esis. Hence, in attacking analytically the proDosition that 
1. Jacques Hadamard, The Psychology: of Invention in 
the Mathematical Field. (Princeton, 1\Tew Jersey, ?rinceton 
University Press, 1945), 112. 
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lines drawn from any point on the perpendicular bisector 
of a line to the extremities of the line are equal, the 
student will start with the conclusion. ~efore he can 
go through any steps, however, he needs to express the hy-
~othesis in terms of an illustration, which he either pic-
tures in his mind or actually draws on paper. A possible 
procedure follows: 
Hypothesis: RY is the perpendicular bisector of AB and 
meets AB at Y; X is any point on RY, distinct from R and 
Y. 
To prove: AX = BX. 
Since corresponding parts of cow':ruent triangles are equal, 
AX=. BX if 
A AXY :!!! A BXY if 
s. A. S. obtains if 
AY =YB if 
Y is the midpoint of AB if 
Y fulfills the definition of midnoint if 
XY is the perpendicular bisector of AB and meets 
AB at Y. {Hypothesis) 
XY .= XY. 
Since all right angles are equal," XYA = L.XYB if 
LXYA is a right angle; LXYB is a right angle if 
XY J. AB at Y if 
XY is the perpendicular bisector of AB and meets 
AB at Y. {Hypothesis) 
With reference to the analytic proof outlined above, 
some mathematicians would doubtless ascribe to intuition 
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the direction assumed by all the steps. 'l'hese people credit 
to intuition not only the first step, but subsecment steps 
as well. Their argument is that the initial imnulse to 
prove a pair of triangles congruent is urr.;ed by the illustra-
tion, which reveals AX and BX to be corresponding parts of 
what appear to be congruent triangles. Any relationship 
that is suggested by a concrete figure is an appeal to intu-
ition, they contend. Furthermore, they insist that the 
steps following the first are likewise suggested by intu-
ition, for example, the step at which Y is proved to be the 
midpoint of AB or the one at which LXYA is shown to be a 
right angle. 
A more conservative group, upon viewin~ the proof, 
would perhaps concede that only the initial direction is 
known intuitively. Thus this group feels that intuition 
is called into p~ay only at the very beginnin~, when a con-
sideration of the figure suggests the possibility of con-
gruent triangles. Still others would point to the pos-
sibility of a combination of experience, analysis of ulti-
mate relationship sought, and trial-and-error providing the 
guidance; these observers might eliminate intuition from 
the picture entirely. A fourth group is composed of those 
who, because of the sketchiness of the evidence offered 
by the other three groups, must remain undecided. They 
strongly suspect that intuition has played a part in the 
proof, so to speak, but cannot overlook the chance of the 
student's having derived direction from other sources, such 
as trial-and-error. 
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Regardless of how the order of the steps in the above 
proof is explained, one must bear in mind that there have 
been experiences in the lives of some famous mathematicians 
that assuredly strengthen the case for intuition. One in-
triguing situation concerns a Frenchman of the seventeenth 
l 
century, Pierre de Fermat. It appears that at the time 
of Fermat's death, someone, while going through the mathe-
matician's papers, found a mystifying comment scribbled in 
a narrow marein. In that margin Fermat had indicated that 
he had proved the impossibility of the relation, xll"I + ym .:: z~ 
when x, y, and z are integers other than zero and m is an 
integer larger than 2. However, he had lamented his not 
having enough space in the margin to write his proof. The 
mystery lies in the fact that in the three hundred years 
since, the proof has not been discovered by anyone, despite 
great efforts. The most that has been accomplished in these 
three centuries of work is some partial proofs. That is, 
proofs for some classes of values of the exponent, m, have 
been discovered. What is inexplicable is the reliance of 
at least one partial proof on algebraic theories that were 
unknown at the time of Fermat and which were not even im-
plied remotely in his v..iri tings. 
Equally puzzling is an account concerning a German 
geometer of a century ago, .bernhard Riemann.2 In his work 
1. Jacques Hadamard, ~ Psychology .2f. Invention .!.!:! 
the Mathematical Field (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton 
University !·ress, 1945), 116 ff. 
2. Ibid., 117 ff. 
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with prime numbers Riemann emphasized a function of a var-
iable which could assume both real and imaginary values. 
At his death, there was found among his papers a note which 
stated that certain properties of the function had been 
deduc,::::ed from an expression of the function which he had 
never simplified enough to publish. As of now, no one has 
the slightest notion of the nature of the expression. 
In both cases, there appears to be some justification 
for the view that these men had intuitive knowled~e which 
they either did not, or could not organize to the extent 
of communicating with others. Thus Fermat seems to have 
"sensed" a proof that, to all appearances, hinged upon re-
lations not yet discovered. Similarly, Riemann "knew'' an 
expression that has eluded other great thinkers down to 
the present. Since apparently neither mathematician could 
have gone through any variety of logical reasoning to reach 
his particular observation, each must have gained his know-
ledge directly, or intuitively. 
Furthermore, intuition can explain the sudden insight 
a problem-solver may experience. In the course of solving 
any problem, there comes the moment when the pattern is 
seen with clarity; this is the moment of insight. Several 
examples of such insight are cited in the next chapter. 
When the problem-solver is unsuccessful, that is, un-
able to obtain the necessary insight, he might try writing 
down all the steps as far as he can go. At each step he 
might ask himself if he is certain of the step and why he 
feels certain. If he comes to a step which makes him feel 
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doubtful, he might try to figure out what it is about the 
step that has shaken his confidence. Regardless of how 
much analyzing he does, however, he should get away from 
his problem for a while. Leaving the problem is advan-
tageous for two reasons. In the first place, there is the 
chance that, after the rest, the student may approach his 
problem from an entirely new slant. For another reason, 
while he is engaged in something quite different from prob-
lem-solving, he just might have a flash of "intuitive in-
sight" into his problem. If so, he will instantly see 
the whole pattern, and thus the solution. Some of the ways 
of perceivinr, the whole pattern will be viewed in the next 
chapter. 
Chapter IV 
Intuition and Insight 
As the moment of achievement in problem-solving comes 
the instant that insight occurs, it would be well to ex-
amine not only the sources of insii;;ht, but also the mean-
ing of the term. Inasmuch as some people may confuse the 
terms insight and intuition and may even consider them 
synonymous, a discussion of the relationship between the 
two appears warranted. 
Insight means discernment, cognition, awareness of the 
pattern connecting ideas previously thought to be unre-
lated. This awareness or discernment may result from a 
careful analysis of the factors involved. Analysis is not 
always a prerequisite, however, for insight may, and often 
does, stem from intuition. The relationship between insight 
and intuition therefore, can be seen in thinkin~ of intu-
ition and analysis as two sources of insi~ht. 
In hopes of gaining insight by analysis, the problem-
solver should continually strive to see the problem as a 
whole.l He should keep viewing the problem from nabove" 
in order to see it as a unit. 
A mathematical illustration of insight stemming from 
analysis is dra'Wil from the field of differential equations. 
A student is asked to solve the differential equation, 
p 4 +. xp - 3Y = o, in which y is the dependent variable, 
1. Howard F. Fehr, "The Role of Insight in the Learning 
of Mathematics", The Mathematics Teacher (October, 1954), 
XLVII, 388. ---
JO. 
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x is the independent variable, and p renresents the rate of 
change of y with respect to x. First of all, the student 
must be clear as to the nature of h~s goal. Required to 
find the solution to a differential eq~ation, he must know 
what the word solution means when used in that particular 
way. At the outset then, before embarking on any steps, 
he visualizes his goal as a relationship involving at least 
one of the variables, which together vnth its derivatives, 
satisfies the given equation. In order that the general 
solution in parametric form may be found, each variable 
must be expressed in terms of p. To express y in terms of 
p, it is necessary to eliminate x. The variable x can be 
eliminated by getting x alone in the left member and then 
differentiating with respect to y. (Of course, to elimi-
nate y in a comparable manner would be just as logical a 
beginning.) 
( 1) Accordingly, since p'f + xp - 3y = 0 
( 2) x :.:!l.. - p3 r 
(J)t =t- (~ i- 3P2)i} 
The act of simplifying, collecting like te~ms, and multi-
plying throughout by l/2p dy reveals a linear equation of the 
first order. 
( 4) 3 d L 3 dy-"'2: y ;.r. = 2. p dp 
Equation (4) is advantageous, for such an equation can be 
changed easily into an exact equation by applying an inte-
-.l. 
grating factor, which,in this case, is p ~. Thus, 
( 5} 
( 6) 
-3_ s .:::.£ 3 _S_ 
pa: dy - ":L yp. dp=. -r p-r dp 
=!.~.LG Integrating, yp 2- :: s p .a.. +s 
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The constant of integration is written as c/5 because the 
presence of the 3/5 demands a multiplication by 5 in order 
that the equation may be cleared of fractions. Writing 
the arbitrary constant term originally as c/5 will yield 
c for the constant after the multiplication by 5 has been 
carried out. Specifically, the next step is to multiply 
throughout by 5p-i-, yielding 
( 7) 5y =- 3P 4I + cp -i; 
In order to express x in terms of the parameter p, the val-
ue for y obtainable from equation (7) is substituted for 
yin equation (2). Thus, 
(8) _, ..L "' C!. -t 3 x~ Jp {s- p+7p )- p 
(9) Simplifying, x=-i:-p3+3: p± 
( 10) 3 3cp~ Clearing of fractions, 5x .::i 4P + 
'l'he general solution consists of equations ( 7) and ( 10). 
In attacking the above problem, the problem-solver's 
realization of the nature of the goal determined his first 
significant move, differentiating with respect to y. Next, 
the correct classificntion of equation (4) was imperative 
that direction for the next step be gained. The third im-
portant point consisted of the substitution performed in 
order to acquire equation (8). 
At all three stages, insi~ht was gained because of 
an ordering and classifying of the elements. At the first 
and third stages, direction was obtained by analyzing the 
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type of relationship sought, an expression for each var-
iable in terms of p and one arbitrary constant. At the 
second stage, an analysis of the make-up of equation (4) 
led to the awareness of linearity and hence to the solu-
tion of that particular equation. 
In sharp contrast to the manner in which insip,ht was 
gained in the oreceding illustration is an interesting 
I 1 
case concerning the German chemist, Friedrich A. Kekule. 
As professor of organic chemistry at Ghent University in 
Belgium, Kekul~ had, for some time, been attempting to 
fathom the molecular arrangement of benzene, which ar-
rangement appeared to elude him. One night in 1$65, he had 
a dream so vivid that as soon as he awoke, he dashed to 
his desk for paper and pencil. Excitedly he drew the pic-
ture so clear in his mind. The pattern that had occurred 
to him while asleep was the arrangement of atoms in a 
molecule of benzene. The next morning he enthusiastically 
show·ed the drawing to his collea~ues, who, understandably 
enough, were not nearly so convinced of the accuracy of 
the diagram as was Kekul6. Through the months, however, 
as experin:ents dealing with the behavior of benzene tended 
I to support Kekule's arrangement, the co-workers became 
proponents of his views. 
About eighty years after the sensational dream and 
1. Lawrence Galton, "The Professor Had a Dream", 
Nation's Business (June, 1948), XXXVI, 67. 
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about fifty years after the chemist's death, absolute 
verification was ac~omplished in the laboratories of 
Eastman Kodak Company. There, molecules of benzene were 
photographed, the photographs bearing out, in the most 
minute detail, the arran~ement known intuitively to 
Kekul~ years beforet 
Not so dramatic, but equally as thrilling is the ex-
perience of a student a year a.P.:o. Here is the problem 
which had teased him for two days. Let P and Q be con-
tinuous functions of x and y and have continuous derivatives, 
with ap/ay == e>Q/-a x, except at the points (4,0), (O,O), and 
"" -1. {-4,0). Let c, denote the circle: {x - 2) + y = 9; let 
( ;L ~ C~ denote the circle: x + 2) + y : 9; let C3 denote 
the circle: x:1. + y .. =. 25. Given that[. P dx + Q dy == 11, 
{P dx + Q dy = 9,f P dx + Q dy =:. 13, findfP dx + Q dy, 
3 2.. .a. c'/ 
where C'f is the circle: x + y =- 1. Upon making a draw-
ing, the student reelized that C3 contained the three cir-
cles enclosing the points of discontinuity. He knew from 
a previously solved problem, that under the conditions in 
the present problem, the line integral around c3 was equal 
to the sum of the line integrals around the circles sur-
rounding the points of discontinuity, provided, that each 
circle about such a point enclosed none of the other trouble-
some points. Herein lay the crux of the whole puzzling 
matter. Unfortunately, the circles C1 and C~ overlapped, 
with C~ being internally tangent to each of the other two 
circles. Perhaps we should not use the word unfortunately 
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since, if the three circles had not overlapped, the exer-
cise would have been trivial, and hence would not have posed 
a problem at all. 
To return to the student, several times he examined 
the drawing, hoping to see some legal way of nmoving" the 
circles so as to have no overlapping. He referred again 
and again to the hypotheses, as a check on the accuracy 
of his diagram. However, his circles bore the very relation-
ships to each other that had been stipula.ted b'! the hypo-
theses. At last, admitting that his tactics were gettinp 
him nowhere, he laid the problem aside and went about other 
duties that were cryinr, for his attention. A few hours 
later, while occupied with a mundane task, he had a flash 
of intuitive insight into the problem. All at once, while 
he was thinking about something utterly different, the 
"flash" caine; right away, without p;oing through any variety 
of "if-then" reasoning, he knew how to combat the overlap-
ping circles. In this moment of insight, he saw that[{-(P dx+ 
Q dy) - £ ( P dx + Q dy)] would indeed give a line integral 
~ 
about a circle surrounding the point (-4,0), a circle that 
would not overlap the others. Simultaneously he saw that he 
could deal in a similar fashion with the point (4,0). All 
of this he grasped in an instant, in much less time than 
is being required to record his experience. 
The insieht realized above was of the "intuitive flash" 
type and was not the outcome of careful analysis and reason-
ing, such as characterized the solution of the differential 
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equation. Like Kekul~, the student obtained insi~ht into 
his Droblem when he '>\las detached from the problem, both 
physically and mentally. 
In all three problems described, the differential 
equation, the molecular arrangement of benzene, and the 
r'roblem dealinp; with line integrals, insight was the immedi-
ate fore-runner of solution. In the last tvw instances, 
penetrating insi~ht came all at once, on an occasion hard-
ly thought conducive to problem-solving. Insivht into 
solving the differential equation, however, followed care-
ful analysis and conscious application of reasoning to the 
problem. No claim is being made that intuition played no 
part at all in solving the first problem; rather, the dis-
tinction between the two methods of solution lies in the 
fact that on the one hand, insight was gained primarily 
by deliberate analysis, whereas on the other hand, insight 
occurred as an unexpected flash of understanding. 
Of course, flashes of insight are not confined to mathe-
matics and laboratory exneriences. Such insight fre('uently 
guides actions in every-day situations as well. For in-
stance, upon being introduced to a stranger, a person may 
"know" instantly that he has just found a friend. Although 
he may not with accuracy be able to attribute his knowledge 
to sudden insight into the other's character, he nevertheless 
senses something in the other that is in harmony with his 
own interests. 
Then too, on the very first day of school, a teacher 
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may need to select a pupil to run an errand. Presupposing 
a lack of acquaintance with her students, the teacher must 
rely on the kind of judgment thct is not based on reason-
ing. She looks the class over; quickly she chooses a child 
she thinks is dependable. Sometimes she errs in making 
such "spot" estimates, but very often subsequent dealings 
with her pupils bear out her initial impressions. 
Also, a judge will sometimes suspend sentence for no 
other reason than a hunch about the character of the ac-
cused; for no identifiable reason, he is confident that 
the other will not abuse the chance to make a new start. 
Speaking of cases involving the law, several crimes 
have been solved because of some officer's intuitive in-
sight. That is, the officer knows the instant he sees a 
particular suspect that he has found the guilty one. Be-
cause of his assurance of the suspect's guilt, he realizes 
that obtaining a confession is simply a matter of time. Of 
course, we are not referring to the type of situation in 
which there are tell..;.tale nervous mannerisms or strong cir-
cumstantial evidence. We mean the kind of case in which 
guilt is immediately known, even when there is not enough 
evidence to warrant strong suspicion. 
On less serious occasions, a person sometimes will have 
real insight into the reliability or lack of reliability of 
another, but for some inexplicable reason, does not abide 
by his hunch. For example, a teacher is approached by a 
pupil in regard to a loan. Perhaps there is something not 
38. 
quite convincing in the story the pupil pours out; per-
haps there is something in the pupil's manner that does 
not ring true. Very possibly the teacher, if he will be 
frank with himself, is aware from the beginning of the in-
tervie·w of the lack of wisdom of lending the nupil money. 
Foolishly, the teacher reaches for his check-book and writes 
the pupil a check for the amount deemed necessary. True, 
the terms of re-payment are discussed; nevertheless, the 
teacher is regrettin~ his action as soon as the pupil has 
left. Months later, when he is forced to admit that he 
will never be able to exact re-payment, he castigates him-
self for having closed his eyes to his first insight, un-
happily correct. 
Hence, insi~ht stemming from intuition can be experi-
enced in widely differing situations, from the arran~ement 
of a molecule of benzene, to a problem in advanced cal-
culus, to an acknowledgment of an introduction, to a court 
of law. 
1,;oncerned primarily vdth the crucial moment in rirob-
lem-solving, the point at which insight occurs, this chapter 
has presented insight as a recognition of the pattern con-
necting the elements of a problem-situation. Furthermore, 
in order to see what relation insight bears to intuition, 
two sources of insight were examined and illustrated in some 
detail. Thus, the solution of the differential equation 
featured analysis as a preliminary to insight, whereas, in 
the solutions to the problems dealing with the molecular 
arrangement of benzene and the line integrals, as well as 
in the less detailed examples, intuition played a dominant 
role. 
Chapter V 
Intuition and lieometry 
Now that a study of the relationship between intuition 
and insight has been presented, the next relationship to 
be regarded is that of intuition to the course so long re-
vered in high school curricula, geometry. The subject of 
intuitive geometry is vigorously debated, with one faction 
asserting that intuition is indispensable to the study of 
geometry and another faction declaring with equal sincerity 
that intuition has no bearing whatever on the topic of 
geometry. 'l'hus, with whichever ± ... action the student aligns 
himself, he must be prepared to defend his position against 
formidable, thought-provoking attacks fro~ the other group. 
Since the subject of intuitive r;eometry is far from shallow, 
it cannot be dispensed with in a summary fashion. The most 
we can hope to do is to present the telling arguments both 
for and against the intuitive approach to the study of ge-
ometry. We believe there is more evidence in favor of the 
one side, rather than, the other. However, we cannot for-
get that there are dissenters whose opinions cannot be 
slighted, who are equally convinced of the reasonableness 
of their stand. 
Before proceeding further, the meaning of the phrase 
intuitive geometry should be clarified. Intuitive geometry, 
often called informal, concrete, heuristic, and experimental, 
is that approach to geometry which is characterized by draw-
ing generalizations from common experiences. In the tradi-
tional, demonstrative type, on the other hand, the subject-
,9. 
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matter is organized into a formal body of proofs. In this 
latter variety of geometry, each new fact is believed true 
by virtue of its being lop;ically derived from statements 
previously accepted. In such geometry, the truth of a par-
ticular statement may or may not be immediately apparent. 
An ardent defender of traditional methods and vir:-
orous opponent to the use of intuition as a basis for 
studying any phase of geometry is an Austrian mathematician, 
Hans Hahn.l Insisting upon a purely logical basis for the 
construction of mathematics, he points to the unreliability 
of intuition as evidence favoring his assertion. Thus, in 
support of his position, he mentions specifically two not-
able facts opposed to what would probably be considered 
"intuitively obvious". For one thing, Hahn brings out the 
fact that there are curves that possess !!.£ tangent at any 
point. Another idea equally unpalatable is his. claim that 
there exist wave curves which cannot be r-·enerated by the 
motion of a point. Hahn says that offhand, anyone, when 
referring to experience, would think the opposite of either 
of these statements to be the case. By making use of con-
vincing illustrations, though, he backs up both statements 
in a manner that cannot be ignored. What this mathematician 
1. Hans Hahn, "Geometry and Intuition", Scientific 
American (April, 1954), CXC, 84 ff. 
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has shown, in a dramatic manner, is that intuition cannot 
be depended upon to guide accurately. 
Hahn's chief argument against the use of intuition in 
geometry, however, is the point dealt with at some length 
in a previous chapter. Reference is being made to the fact 
that the word intuition is defined differently by different 
people. According to Hahn, the lack of definition implies 
the impossibility of ascribing any particular ~eometric truths 
to intuition, which, in turn, implies the utter uselessness 
of intuition as a basis for geometry. 
At the other extreme, another mathematician, William 
Betz, goes so far as to assert that intuition plays an in-
dispensable part in demonstrative geometry.I With great 
~ervor he outlines several significant supporting facts, 
of which a few will be presented here. In the first place, 
he maintains that intuition c_annot be overlooked, for sooner 
or later, every relation must be explained by meaningful 
terms. Apparently, Betz thinks that, for a term to be mean-
ingf'ul, it must be related to experience, to ordinary ob-
servation. 
Also, any use of geometric figures is an appeal to 
intuition. Not only are physical properties of figures 
1. William Betz, The Teaching of Intuitive Geometry, 
Eighth Yearbook of the National Councfl of Teachers of 
Mathematics (New York, Bureau of Publications, Teachers 
College, Columbia University, 1933), 55 ff. 
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known by intuition, but positional facts as well. For in-
stance, intersecting lines, intersecting circles, concentric 
circles, and adjacent angles are so understood. 
Most significant, though, is the function of intuition 
in the so-called "logical" aspects of geometry. As indicated 
earlier, the validity of a particular step in a proof is 
designated by logic, but which step to take next is often 
suggested by intuition. Thus, even in the construction of 
a synthetic proof, some credit should go to intuition, for, 
previous to being built up synthetically, the proof probably 
was thought through analytically. During the analytic stap:es, 
intuition may have been instrumental in determining the order 
of the steps. 
Further evidence favoring intuition in geometry is found 
in history. Only a novice naively credits all the relation-
ships in Euclidean eeometry to Euclid himself. Euclid's 
genius lay not in discovery, but rather in the ability to 
organize effectively relationships already known by intu-
ition. That these relationships grasped intuitively by the 
people of pre-Euclidean times were not proved, did not 
lessen the assurance with which they were applied in prac-
tical situations. Hence, before the rise of demonstrative 
geometry, mathematical relationships, lackin~ both nroof 
and organization, were nevertheless known to be true; such 
knowledge is being ascribed to intuition. 
Supported by staggering evidence gathered from the 
necessity for meaningful terms, from the universal use of 
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geometric fi.'';Ures, from the manner in which nosi tional facts 
are ascertained, from the indispensable role played in the 
development of an analytic proof, and from history, the case 
for intuition as a basis for geometry is a stron7 one. The 
question now arises as to the methods appropriate for pre-
senting a course in intuitive geometry. 
Before embarking on any kind of answer to that question, 
perhaps we had better make sure that no one has been misled 
in the orevious discussion. In the references to two tyoes 
of r-i:eometry, intuitive and demonstrative, we did not intend 
to give the impression that we are thinkinp: of these two 
approaches as poles apart. That is, we have not meant to 
imply that a course in demonstrative geometry can make no 
use of intuition, or vice versa. '!'he distinction is be-
tween emphases rather than between methods thought mutually 
exclusive. That the two emphases may work hand-in-hand will 
now be demonstrated. 
First of all, in teaching beginners in demonstrative 
geometry, the teacher should make postulates of all facts 
that can be known intuitively.I A list of such facts 
fol1ows: 
1. Vertical angles are equal 
2. If two straight lines are cut by a transversal so 
1. Gertrude E. Allen, !!:!.. Experiment in Redistribution 
of Material for Hii::rh School Geometr*, FiftnYearbook of the 
National Council~Teachers of Mat ematics (New York, Bureau 
of. Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1930) 
79ff. 
that the corresponding angles are equal, the lines are 
parallel, and the converse. 
3. If two straight lines are cut by a transversal 
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so that the alternate interior angles are equal, the lines 
are parallel, and the converse. 
4. The area of a rectangle is equal to the product 
of the length and the width. 
5. A central angle has the same number of degrees 
as its intercepted arc. 
6. Equal central angles have equal arcs, and the 
converse. 
7. If, while approaching their respective limits, 
two variables are always equal, then their limits are equal. 
8. The base angles of an isosceles triangle are equal, 
and other properties of figures which are evident from sym-
metry should be postulated. 
9. Two triangles that have three pairs of corres-
ponding sides equal are con~ruent, and other cases in 
which congruence can be determined by super,osition should 
be postulated. 
Since a student can know any of the above facts intu-
itively, he need not go through proofs; after all, once 
he sees the relationships indicated above, he is as sure 
as he will ever be of their acceptability. Any proof he 
might think through would not add a whit to his sureness. 
Just as important as postulating statements intuitive-
ly acceptable is the necessity for giving emphasis to ge-
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ometry in the elementary grades. It is a lamentable fact 
that some schools, possibly most, stress geometry too little 
in the upper grades. Geometry, like foreign language, has 
suffered from being rele~ated exclusively to high school 
level, at least as regards most aspects of the subject. 
Such short-sightedness in curriculum-planning has resulted 
in the student's confusion, and hence, fear. All at once, 
when enrolled in tenth-grade geometry, the student finds 
himself subjected to a method of presentation different from 
that employed in any of his other subjects. Then too, the 
subject-matter of geometry clings together in a fasion new 
to him and utterly unlike anything previously encountered. 
Furthermore, he must learn a whole new vocabulary. Reflect 
for a little on the barrier to communication that is raised 
by such terms as parallel, transversal, theorem, postulate, 
axiom, converse, contrapositive, and perpendicular. Even 
the spelling of some of the tenns presents hazards, as 
witness the word rarallel. It would be interesting to 
compile a list of the variety of attempts at spelling this 
one word that may appear in only one set of final examina-
tionst 
Thus, to the student who has had no preparation for 
the study of geometry, the subject must seem to be a hodge-
podge of facts, figures, and unfamiliar terms which must 
somehow be lined up into precise, formal proofs. 
To help their pupils avoid the confusion resulting 
from the attempt to assimilate too many new ideas too 
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quickly, teachers can present some of the terms and relation-
ships earlier in the pupil's school-life. Small beginnings 
can even be made in the fourth and fifth grades. An in-
teresting sidelight is the fact that there actually exist 
textbooks in geometry that were written for the use of 
1 
children as young as five years of age. 
It seems that, at the very least, the children of the 
intermediate grades could be tau:::;ht to identify the more 
common geometric figures, such as the square, the circle, 
and the triangle. As a special plea, let the junior high 
school pupil understand the true relationship between rec-
tangles and squares, so that he will !!.,2! think of those 
two figures as members of two distinct classes. In our 
own experience, we do not recall a single case of a Puoil 
embarking upon tenth-grade geometry with the realization 
that a square is ~ special type of rectangle. 
While introducing the young pupil to geometric figures, 
let us not limit ourselves to the plane figures. After 
all, the child lives in a three-dimensional world. He is 
familiar with boxes, tin cans, lamp shades, and ice cream 
cones, to name just a few of the solids that are an integral 
part of his life. Therefore, it is logical that he be 
1. William Betz, The Teaching of Intuitive Geometry, 
Eighth Yearbook of the National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics (New York, Bureau of Publications, Teachers 
College, Columbia University, 1933), 63. 
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taught to differentiate among, for example, rectangular 
solids, cylinders, cones, and frustums of cones. With 
skillful teaching, he can be led to observe the identify-
ing properties, both those that separate the solids and 
those that group various ones together. 
In addition to observing the properties, the student 
should be required to articulate his observations, as such 
a requirement will train him in precise statement and clear 
expression. Hence, hand-in-hand with observing relation-
ships among concrete figures, the student should be ob-
liged to express his observations verbally, not only in 
order to contribute to the classwork, but especially to 
clarify his own thinking. Often tenth-grade students cap-
able of making keen observations have been hampered by the 
inability to express themselves. Thus, training a pupil 
to articulate his thoughts will equip him with just as val-
uable an asset as will teaching him to observe relation-
ships. Both these assets will serve him in good stead when 
he is launched upon demonstrative ~eometry. 
Furthermore, the junior high school student is not 
too young, in our opinion, to comprehend the relativity 
of truth. He can surely be led to see that something is 
true only to the extent that something else is true, which, 
in turn, is true only to the extent that a third statement 
is acceptable. ~uch an understanding will give him the 
enormous advantae:e of realizing that, in any kind of reason-
ing, a set of basic assumptions is the startinp.; place. >re 
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say advantage, because, aware of the need for assumptions, 
he will not be surprised that his course in demonstrative 
geometry first lists assumptions, which he will expect 1Q. 
~ in support of later statements. 
In the junior high grades, the main goal, in re~ard 
to the parts dealing with geometry, should be to acquaint 
the pupils experimentally with geometric facts. Such ex-
perimentation involves intuition, for facts comprehended 
immediately through the senses will be accepted, without 
the formalization of proof. 
Not only the junior high school pupils, but the tenth-
grade students as well, can benefit from intuitive exper-
imentation. It is suggested that, as much as possible, 
the students in high school geometry be allowed to use 
the intuitive approach, which utilizes constantly the 
student's experiences and common-sense understandings. It 
is recommended that there be no abrupt jump, but rather, 
a gradual transition, from the intuitive to the demon-
strative. If well-organized and well-tauP.ht, the course 
in geometry can successfully combine knowledge gained with-
out recourse to formal reasoning with knowledge derived 
from ideas previously accepted. 
Also, by making frequent use of the analytic method 
of proof and of generalizations that can be drawn from 
inspection of concrete members of a class of figures, the 
teacher will call intuition into play. Best of all, in 
using the analytic method of proof, the class will be able 
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to see how the synthetic proof is built up. 
Looking back, this chapter first presented the "pros" 
and "cons" of intuitive geometry. In view of the heavy 
evidence favoring such course-work, it appeared worthwhile 
to note some of the theorems that could very well be pos-
tulated and why they could be postulated. The latter part 
of the chapter dealt with suggestions for including intu-
itive geometry in junior high school arithmetic and the 
advantages gained thereby. Also, reference was made to the 
possible combining of the intuitive and demonstrative phases 
of a tenth-grade course in geometry. 
• 
Chapter VI 
Intuition and Mathematical Foundations 
In the course of considering intuition as a basis for 
certain phases of geometry, one may naturally wonder about 
the role of intuition in the very foundations of math-
ematics. Although no clear-cut statement is possible, the 
positions of two of the leading schools of thought will 
be portrayed in hopes of shedding some much-needed light. 
We are referring, of course, to the intuitionist and for-
malist schools of mathematical foundations. Following a 
cursory examination of the views of the schools deemed by 
the writer to be the most significant, implications of op-
posine attitudes towards the Law of the Excluded Middle 
will be explored. 
Probably the predominant characteristic of the for-
malist school, of which David Hilbert was the leadin~ ex-
ponent, is the thought that the foundations of mathematics 
do not lie in logic, but rather, in prelogical symbols that 
are the bases for logical thinking and are understood intu-
itively .l These prelogical symbols, the formalists argue, 
should be manipulated mechanically according to arbitrary 
rules, so that the whole body of mathematics becomes for-
malized into a collection of formulae.2 
1. E. R. Stabler, Introduction to Mathematical Thought 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, Addison-WeS!ey Publishing Company, 
Incorporated, 1953), 250. 
2. Louis o. Kattsoff, A Philosophy of Mathematics 
{Ames, Iowa, The Iowa State College Press-;-1949), 122. 
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Furthermore, the arbitrary rules followed in manipulating 
the symbols are restricted only to the condition that they 
display consistency.l Such consistency, the formalists claim, 
is sufficient to guarantee existence of any particular num-
ber.2 For instance, it might be assumed that there is no 
such number as one with a special given property. Suppose, 
however, that reasoning based on a set of postul~tes al-
ready accepted leads to a contradiction of the assumption 
with regard to the number. This contradiction is enough, 
the formalists argue, to give assurance of the actual 
existence of the number. In other words, the contradiction 
of the assumption that there is .!12 such number means that 
there is such a number. More generally, a statement is 
considered to be true if it can be shown to lead to no 
contradiction.3 
On the other side of the fence, the intuitionists assert 
that consistency does not imply existence (of a number) but 
rather, merely the possibility of existence.4 Thus, if 
the assumption of the existence of a particular number be 
contradicted, then only the possibility of the existence of 
the number will have been demonstrated. To be certain that 
a number really does exist, one must construct the number 
explicitly, thereby changing the possibility into an actuality_ 
1. Louis O. Kattsoff, A Philosophy of Mathematics 
(Ames, Iowa, The Iowa State-College Press, 1949), 116. 
2. Ibid., 157. 
J. Ibid., 122. 
4. Ibid., 157. 
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In addition, the intuitionists believe that knowledge 
of mathematical concepts is gained immediately by intuition, 
and not through the offices of symbolism, so revered by the 
formalists. 
However, it is in the realm of infinite sets where the 
views of the two schools differ so widely. In fact, in 
that realm, the schools are diametrically opposed to each 
other. Because they limit their rules only to the con-
dition of consistency, the formalists, in contending that 
consistency implies existence, necessarily hold the Law 
of the Excluded Middle to be applicable always, even to 
situations concerned with an infinite array of propositions.l 
In order to apply the Law of the Excluded Middle to an in-
finite set, they surely are assuminp, that ordinary two-
valued logic obtains. 2 After all, if a particular proposi-
tion is believed true, the falsity of the other possibilities 
relative to the proposition must have been previously es-
tablished. Thus the formalists are assuming that every 
member of the infinite set has to be either true or false. 
That a member of an infinite array must be either true 
or false is the very point 1"lith which the intuitionists 
disagree, and the-/ disagree violently. Inasmuch as not all 
members of an infinite set can be examined, one by one, 
1. Louis O. Kattsoff, A Philosophy of Mathematics 
(Ames, Iowa, The Iowa State College Press-;-1949), 122. 
2. According to two-valued logic, something is either 
true or false; hence, truth and falsity are the only pos-
sibilities. 
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the truth or falsity of every member cannot be ascertained. 
Therefore, when dealing with infinite sets, the intuition-
ists maintain that a three-valued logic is reauisite; that 
is, each member must be categorized as pne of these three: 
true, false, or "undecidable". 
Apparently, the intuitionists have a point, for un-
deniably, not all the members of an infinite set can be 
tested or scrutinized. Since not every member can be 
studied, it is illogical to Assert that every member is 
either true or false. Since the application of the idea 
of the "excluded middle" implies just such testin~, it does 
not appear reasonable to claim that any one point is true 
simply because of its being the "middle". For that matter, 
the words excluded middle could bear defining when used in 
conjunction with sets not finite. The word middle seems 
to indicate a group made up of a finite number of things. 
Hence, the use of the term in connection with an infinite 
number of objects is paradoxical. 
On the other hand, the formalists' assertion of the 
truth of any statement not contradicted by an agreed-upon 
set of postulates is entirely acceptable to us. In any 
variety of logical reasoning, a set of 2ssumptions deemed 
basic must be subscribed to first. Once the basic assump-
tions have been outlined, any proposition consistent with 
1. Louis o. Kattsoff, A Philosophy of Mathematics 
(Ames, Iowa, The Iowa State College Press-;-1949) , 175. 
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the "foundation facts" is considered true. At any rate, 
such a proposition is true to the extent that the basic 
assumptions are true. Hecause of their emphasis on con-
sistency, the formalists feel that if the proposition that 
no number with a specified property exists can be shown 
to be contradicted, (when reference is made to the set of 
postulates deemed basic), then they can be assured that 
the number does indeed exist. 
On the matter of existence of numbers, we cannot go 
the 
along with~intuitionists' insistence on the necessity of 
construction of the number. Perhaps they mean by construe-
.tion that the number must be exhibited or demonstrated in 
some fashion. However, surely application of the Law of 
the Excluded Middle to a finite set could prove that a 
number with the required property exists, even though the 
number is not identified in any way. Of course, it could 
be that the intuitionists are defining existence differently 
than their opponents are defining the term. 
In behalf of the intuitionists, though, their views 
regarding infinite sets are not only interesting, but seem 
to make sound sense as well. Je are alluding especially 
to the thought that contradiction of the stEitement rel-
ative to non-existence implies only the possibility that 
the opposite is true. We keep thinking of how the absence 
of an alibi merely indicates the possibility of the guilt 
of a suspect, not the actual r~uilt. Maybe the analogy is 
not too far-fetched to help bring out our point. 
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Throughout the course of these chapters, this paper 
has dealt with the role of intuition in various situa-
tions. Thus, throu~h description and illustration, in-
tuition has been shown to be intimately concerned not 
only with problem-solving, insight, and geometry, but 
with the ultimate foundations of mathematics as well. 
As with the other three topics, the relationship of in-
intuition to foundations is a controversial one; at one 
pole, the formalists ascribe knowledge of symbols to 
intuition, and at the other, the intuitionists, with 
equal assurance, credit knowledge of the numbers them-
selves to intuition. 
Epilogue 
The mathematician, in accepting the challenge of a 
problem, may summon various aids to meet the demands in-
volved. For one thing, he may seek ideas from people 
whose scholarship appears to merit confidence and who hive 
satisfied him as to their ability to apply clear, reasonably 
objective thinking to questions. 
As another aid, the mathematician may take mental ex-
cursions into the reasoning of various writers. Of course, 
these excursions entail the heavy responsibility for sorting 
out the ideas that appear pertinent and interpretin~ these 
ideas in his ovm terms. Aware of the risk that is always 
involved in attempting to interpret the mind of another, 
he can only hope that the exercise of care and discretion 
will effect a fair representation. 
In the third place, the mathematician may, and often 
does examine his own experiences as teacher and student. 
That is, he may try to re-trace t~ thinking done in solving 
particular problems. Such introspection is very difficult, 
for what could be harder than to attempt to analyze one's 
own thinking? Since, try as he will, the mathematician 
cannot dissociate himself from himself, he regards the task 
of scrutinizing his own reasoning as his most difficult 
assignment. Although aware that his view of himself may be 
grossly inaccurate, he nevertheless forges ahead in his 
efforts to unravel the chain of thoughts that have led him 
to a solution. An individual endowed with intense curiosity, 
he would probably try to study his thinking even if there 
were no possible "practicalu outcome, such as application 
of the method analyzed to future problems. 
Thus, when attacking a new topic that is just obscure 
enough to provide the necessary challenge, the mathematician 
may call upon opinions of his teachers, writings he deems 
pertinent, and his own experiences as ~ides. 
After classifying and interpreting the ideas assembled, 
he may lean back in his chair with a kind of quiet elation 
over having found some sort of system in the ideas he has 
handled. Before long, however, he leans forward, reaching 
for paper and pencil. After all, just ahead is a new challenge. 
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